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THE FAILURE OF ATTACKS ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM 
Earl M Maltz* 
In assessing the importance of any particular theory to a field 
of study, one might well use a combination of two techniques. T:.~ 
most obvious technique would be to count the number of adherents 
which the theory commands and assess their prominence. As more 
scholars-particularly well-known scholars-profess allegiance to a 
given mode of analysis, it perforce assumes greater importance. In 
addition, however, one might focus on the frequency and vehe-
mence with which the relevant theory is attacked. Typically critics 
simply ignore those opposing positions that they consider trivial. 
Thus the mere fact that opponents often take the time to attempt to 
refute a position is important evidence of its significance. 
One's evaluation of originalism-the theory that in constitu-
tional adjudication judges should be bound by the intent of the 
framersi-will vary greatly depending upon which of these tech-
niques one employs. Only a very small minority of constitutional 
theorists claim to be originalists.2 Taken alone, this might suggest 
that originalism is only a minor theme in the overall development of 
constitutional theory. But if an observer focuses on the frequency 
and vehemence with which the approach is criticized, originalism 
emerges as one of the most important constitutional theories. For 
the proposition that judges should adhere to the intent of the fram-
ers generates unceasing, often vitriolic attacks from those who ad-
vocate other modes of constitutional analysis. Indeed, virtually 
every nonoriginalist theorist begins his analysis with an extensive 
discussion of the perceived flaws in the originalist approach. 
How does one explain the pervasive fear of the looming specter 
of originalism? It may very well reflect at least an implicit under-
* Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden). The author gratefully acknowledges the 
assistance of Rudy Peritz. 
I. The term "originalism" is Paul Brest's. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the 
Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980). Others refer to the same theory as 
"interpretivism." See, e.g.,]. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Grey, Do We Have 
an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 702 (1975). 
2. See Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 373. 378 (1982) (originalism is 
"increasingly without defenders, at least in the academic community"). 
43 
44 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 4:43 
standing that the justifications for originalist theory are far more 
powerful than those which are normally put forth. For far from 
being based on a simplistic appeal to the concept of democracy (the 
most common refuge of originalist theorists)3 originalism rests on a 
variety of complex basic premises. These premises reflect funda-
mental conceptions of the nature of the judicial process and the 
proper allocation of authority between the courts and other 
branches of government. 4 These conceptions are rarely if ever fully 
and clearly articulated; further, their correctness cannot be rigor-
ously demonstrated. Nonetheless the concepts embodied in origi-
nalism rather plainly reflect views on the nature of judging which 
have a strong intuitive appeal to many Americans. 
The strength of this appeal is reflected in the structure of judi-
cial opinions. Even results which are patently inconsistent with 
originalism are often couched in rhetoric about the intent of the 
framers. Moreover, one cannot read a broad range of constitutional 
cases without reaching the conclusion that originalism has in fact 
been an important influence on the development of constitutional 
doctrine (although admittedly not the only influence). Thus in or-
der to forego originalist analysis one must also be willing to aban-
don a major part of the American judicial tradition. 
It is against this background that the attacks on originalism 
must be evaluated. Basically, these attacks can be divided into two 
categories, "comparative" and "absolute." Comparative arguments 
evaluate the putative results generated by originalism with those 
which would be produced by some alternative mode of constitu-
tional analysis. Such arguments typically conclude that since the 
alternative mode would generate better results, originalism should 
be abandoned.s Absolute arguments, by contrast, do not depend on 
demonstrating the superiority of some specific alternative; instead, 
focusing only on the originalist position itself, these arguments con-
clude that the basic structure of that position is inherently flawed. 
I have argued elsewhere that in making their comparative ar-
guments, nonoriginalists have both overstated the advantages of al-
ternative approaches and understated the costs associated with such 
3. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. I. 2-4 (1971); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 353, 371-72 
(1981): Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 6<l3, 704-06 (1976). 
4. See Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem-The Role of the In lent of the 
Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U.L. REV. 811, 831-36 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 
Maltz, New Thoughts]; Maltz. The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. <l<l5, 
997-1000 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Maltz, Dark Side]. 
5. For classic examples of comparative argument, see M. PERRY, THE CONSTITU· 
TIOI', THE COURTS. AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Grey. supra note I. at 710-14. 
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approaches.6 In any event, comparative arguments are by their na-
ture inconclusive. First, both originalist and nonoriginalist posi-
tions typically rest on controversial fundamental premises regarding 
the appropriate nature of the basic structure of government. For 
example, while originalists typically argue that aggressive judicial 
review is difficult to reconcile with the concept of democracy, no-
noriginalists often contend that an activist judiciary is vital to 
American democracy. 7 Stripped of the reference to the emotion-
ally-charged term "democracy," in essence the originalists are argu-
ing that a pure majoritarian system is intrinsically superior, while 
the nonoriginalists are rejecting the pure majoritarian ethic. 
Neither premise is susceptible to objective proof; one can adopt 
either without fear of conclusive refutation. 
A second problem with comparative arguments is that they 
often rest on unprovable assumptions about the tangible effects of 
the adoption of a particular nonoriginalist approach. In this respect 
discussions of Dean John Hart Ely's representation-reinforcement 
analysis are typical. Ely himself would limit fundamental rights to 
those that help to purify the democratic political process.s By con-
trast, others have argued that Ely's representation-reinforcement 
approach necessarily implies that other rights should also be given 
special judicial solicitude; among those most often proposed are a 
right to welfare and a right to a public education.9 To some, the 
choice between Ely's approach and originalism might turn on the 
resolution of this controversy. 
The result of these uncertainties is that in purely comparative 
terms neither originalists nor nonoriginalists can ultimately win the 
argument over judicial review. Instead, resolution of the political 
debate will turn on the question of which side has the burden of 
proof. Perhaps because of these difficulties, in recent years 
nonoriginalists have increasingly turned to absolute arguments in 
their attempts to incontrovertibly discredit originalism. The abso-
lute attacks generally take one of three forms. Linguistic arguments 
claim that the originalist position does not adequately specify the 
methodology which judges are to follow in constitutional cases. 
Certainty-based arguments, by contrast, posit a definite originalist 
6. See Maltz, New Thoughts, supra note 4; Maltz, Dark Side, id. 
7. Compare sources cited note I supra with, e.g., Simon, The Authority of the Framers 
of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1482 
(1985). For an evaluation of the originalist argument on this point, seen. 4 and accompany-
ing text, infra. 
8. See 1. ELY, supra note I, at 73-104. 
9. See, e.g., San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez. 41 I U.S. I, 62-63 (1973) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Michelman. Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 
WASH. U.L.Q. 659. 
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structure but contend that the results generated by that structure 
are so uncertain as to be intolerable. Finally, some argue that no 
defensible political or moral theory supports originalism. 
In much the same way in which they deal with comparative 
arguments, originalists typically respond to absolute arguments in 
terms which are equally absolute. With respect to important issues, 
they argue that the historical evidence is perfectly clear and incon-
trovertible.Io Further, they often contend that the originalist mode 
of interpretation is the only methodology consistent with a coherent 
"objective" concept of law'' or with democratic theory.12 Thus 
originalists conclude that originalism is the only methodology that 
provides a principled mode of constitutional interpretation. 
Phrased in such stark terms, the originalist arguments are quite 
weak. Rather plainly, the historical evidence is uncertain on some 
points.n Further, one need only consult the nonoriginalist litera-
ture itself to discover carefully wrought theories of law which do 
not proceed from originalist premises. Finally, originalist theory it-
self creates tensions with even the most simplistic concept of 
democracy.I4 
The weakness of the standard formulations of the originalist 
arguments makes the absolutist contentions seem stronger than 
they actually are. For to refute the absolutist counterarguments, 
one need not demonstrate that originalism is the only conceivable 
approach to constitutional adjudication. It suffices to show that ref-
erences to the framers' intent may be tenable. 
THE LINGUISTIC ARGUMENT 
To understand the linguistic argument, one must first focus on 
the structure of the originalist position. In its simplest terms, that 
position may be stated as follows: "In constitutional adjudication, 
the duty of the court is to interpret the constitutional text. The 
proper mode of interpreting a legal text is to determine the intent of 
the drafter or drafters of that text and to apply that intent to the 
case before the court. Therefore, in constitutional cases the court 
should apply the intent of the framers." The originalist position 
10. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). 
II. See, e.g., id. at 283-300; Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a 
Democratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. I, 18-20 (1981). 
12. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 3, at 2-4; Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 702-04. 
13. For example, on the issue of whether the framers of the fourteenth amendment 
intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states, compare R. BERGER. supra note 
10, at 134-47 with Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 14 CoNN. L. 
REV. 237 (1982). 
14. See notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
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plainly rests on two premises: first, that the proper function of the 
Court is to interpret the Constitution and second, that the proper 
mode of interpretation is determination of the intent of the framers. 
Even nonoriginalists typically accept the premise that the role 
of courts is to interpret the Constitution. Is They attack the remain-
der of the originalist argument with a number of linguistic conten-
tions. Some nonoriginalists say that interpretation does not 
necessarily imply inquiry into the intent of the framers; they note, 
for example, that literary critics and philosophers quite often view 
the interpretation of language as a process entirely independent of 
the determination of the intent of the author of the relevant 
words.I6 More commonly, nonoriginalists tum their linguistic anal-
ysis on the concept of the "intent of the framers." First, they note 
that even where a document has a single drafter, the use of particu-
lar words may reflect a variety of intentions, each of which may be 
defined quite narrowly or broadly.11 In addition, nonoriginalists 
rely heavily on the fact that constitutions are the product of many 
institutions and many drafters, each of whom may have a different 
intent. Is 
The common thread which connects the various linguistic ar-
guments is the perception of the indeterminacy of the originalist 
position. Focusing on the variety of meanings which can be given 
to both interpretation and intent, nonoriginalist linguistic analysts 
contend that one of two conclusions is inevitable: either originalism 
is inherently incapable of providing a meaningful standard to guide 
judges, or almost any mode of constitutional adjudication can ap-
propriately be viewed as fitting within the originalist formulation. 
Thus the linguistic analysts argue that the search for "the" intent of 
the framers is inevitably a fruitless task. They conclude that there-
fore some nonoriginalist theory of constitutional adjudication must 
be adopted. 
In analyzing nonoriginalist linguistic arguments, one must first 
recognize the broad scope of the contentions which the arguments 
15. See, e.g., Richards, Interpretation and Historiography, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 489 
(1985); Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603 (1985). 
16. For a good sampling of the nonoriginalist arguments on this point, see two recent 
symposia devoted entirely to discussions of the concept of interpretation in judicial reasoning. 
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1-725 (1985); 60 TEX. L. REV. 373-586 (1982). 
17. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 469,483-97 (1981); 
Munzer & Nickel, Does The Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?. 77 CoL. L. REV. 
1029, 1030-32 (1977); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism 
and Neutral Principles. 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 798-99 (1983). 
18. See, e.g., Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 459-60 
(1984); Brest, supra note I, at 212-13; Dworkin, supra note 17, at 482-84, 487-88; Levinson, 
supra note 2, at 379. 
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are said to support. Certainly one can agree that terms such as "in-
terpretation" and "intent of the framers" can be defined in a variety 
of ways. But one still must choose among the various potential 
meanings; and since the meaning chosen serves to define the proper 
function of the courts-part of the government-such a choice is 
most plausibly based on political considerations.I9 Thus if the only 
point of linguistic arguments is to demonstrate the possibility of al-
ternative definitions, such arguments merely lead us back to the 
political and moral critiques of the originalist position; indepen-
dently, the linguistic approach does not add significantly to the 
strength of the nonoriginalist position. 
In order to be independently significant, linguistic arguments 
must go further and demonstrate either that originalists assign no 
particular meaning to the relevant terms or that adoption of the 
meanings assigned would not significantly constrain the courts. 
The linguistic attack on the originalist conception of "interpreta-
tion" satisfies neither of these criteria. The originalist does not ar-
gue that reference to the intent of the framers is the only possible 
definition of interpretation; only that the proper role of the courts is 
interpretation and that by interpretation she means reference to the 
framers' intent. Thus in the originalist lexicon use of the term inter-
pretation becomes simply a method for referring to the duty of the 
courts to act in accord with the intent of the framers. In linguistic 
terms, the argument therefore turns on an evaluation of the 
originalist use of the latter concept. 
On their face, the nonoriginalist arguments that focus directly 
on the language of the intent term seem quite plausible. Unlike the 
concept of interpretation, the originalist formulation contains no di-
rect referent for the intent term. There is no apparent barrier to 
adopting any of a number of plausible concepts of intent-either in 
terms of the breadth of the intent to be analyzed or the identity of 
the persons whose intent is deemed important. If one concept of 
intent is as good as another, the originalist position crumbles. 
Is the concept of intent, as used by originalists, hopelessly inde-
terminate? To answer this question, let us begin by distinguishing 
carefully between the content of an idea and the language used to 
describe that idea. A person begins by developing a concept in his 
mind. At some stage he decides to attempt to communicate that 
concept to others. At that point the relevant concept may be fully 
formed and specific or underdeveloped and vague. But in any 
event, the communicator must choose the language which he be-
lieves will best express his idea. 
19. See Richards, supra note IS. at 499. 
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Even assuming that he has developed the relevant concept with 
great precision, he may face a variety of problems in this process. 
First, if the idea is to be disseminated widely, the communicator 
must recognize that people may differ widely in their understanding 
of the meaning of particular words. Thus, he must remember that 
his own understanding of the meaning of a word is not dispositive; 
instead, he must employ language which will effectively convey his 
meaning to others. Further, even if he chooses his mode of expres-
sion with great care, some are likely to misunderstand the message. 
The use of terms such as "democracy" and "democratic the-
ory" in the debate over judicial review illustrates this point. Virtu-
ally all participants in the debate agree that an appeal to democratic 
theory connotes a general belief in the principle of political equality. 
At times, however, democracy is defined to embrace additional val-
ues as well. For example, some suggest "true" democracy requires 
a certain measure of equality in the distribution of wealth.zo The 
result is that when one refers to an idea as grounded in democratic 
theory, different listeners may attach different implications to that 
reference. 
The mere fact that an idea may be expressed imperfectly or 
ambiguously does not, however, suggest that the communicator has 
not developed a fully-formed, concrete theory. For example, when 
Dean Ely refers to the concept of democracy, he is basically con-
cerned only with equal access to the political process; by contrast, 
Professor Richard Parker includes economic equality within his 
definition of democracy. In each case the content of the relevant 
concept itself is relatively clear; it is only the language used to con-
vey the concept which is ambiguous. 
The linguistic attacks on originalist theory are vulnerable to a 
similar analysis. Admittedly, on its face the intent term is subject to 
diverse interpretations. Yet originalists themselves clearly intend 
the term to convey a fairly precisely defined concept of the proper 
functioning of the judicial process. This concept embodies both a 
specific definition of intent and an established hierarchy among the 
intents of those who participated in the drafting process. 
Originalists clearly define intent narrowly rather than broadly. 
The term refers to the contemporaneously expected impact of rele-
vant provisions instead of the general motivations of those involved 
in the drafting. While the hierarchy of drafters is discussed less 
often, a number of principles emerge from the literature. With re-
spect to section one of the fourteenth amendment, for example, dis-
20. See. e.g .. Parker. The Past of Constitutional 71leory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 223 (1981 ). 
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cussions of the intentions of Congress rather than of the ratifying 
states predominate. Within Congress, the most important opinions 
are generally perceived to be those of John Bingham, the drafter of 
the specific language, and Thaddeus Stevens and Jacob Howard, 
who made the official presentations of the views of the Joint Com-
mittee on Reconstruction, which developed the fourteenth amend-
ment. The views of Republican supporters in the 39th Congress 
typically are also accorded significant weight. Other evidence is 
largely tangential. 
Nonoriginalist linguistic analysts therefore do not show that 
the basic concept of originalism itself cannot give effective guidance 
to judges in constitutional adjudication; at most nonoriginalists can 
contend that the intent term generally used to describe the concept 
is insufficiently specific. This hardly seems a telling criticism of the 
basic theory. If insufficient specificity is the problem, the solution is 
to make the language more specific rather than to abandon original-
ism entirely. 
Moreover, an attack on the specificity of the intent term would 
be overstated in any event. The use of the term is a clear reference 
to the intent of the legislature. In that context the courts have de-
veloped a relatively clear set of conventions which largely resolve 
any ambiguities generated by the use of the concept of intent. The 
same conventions can be easily adapted to the resolution of similar 
problems encountered in the constitutional context. 
Indeed, when it suits their purposes nonoriginalists themselves 
have little difficulty in giving content to the intent term. One of the 
major political arguments against originalist theory is that its 
adoption would force the courts to abandon "good" decisions such 
as Brown v. Board of Education and Griswold v. Connecticut.2 1 
Nonoriginalists could hardly make such an assertion if they did not 
have a clear understanding of what the use of the intent term 
entails. 
THE ARGUMENT FROM UNCERTAINTY 
Assuming arguendo that the intent term can be viewed as a 
single, well-defined, concrete entity, nonoriginalists often base part 
of their attack on the difficulty of ascertaining historical "facts" 
such as the intent of the framers. Typically the arguments focus on 
such factors as the necessary incompleteness of the evidence and the 
difficulty of placing oneself within the world view of those who lived 
21. See. e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 5, at 1-2: Gerety, Doing Without Privacy, 42 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 143 (1981). 
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one or two centuries ago. The uncertainty generated by these fac-
tors is viewed as a fatal flaw in the originalist argument.22 
Nonoriginalists are correct in asserting that one can rarely de-
termine the actual intent of the framers with absolute certainty. 
The key question is whether such uncertainty should be viewed as a 
dispositive objection to originalism. On this point two different 
types of argument might be made. 
First one might argue that certainty of result is the most 
important attribute of any system of judicial review.23 By this 
criterion, the important question is not whether the results which 
would be generated by the adoption of a particular theory are un-
certain. Instead the key issue is whether the degree of uncertainty 
inherent in the application of the challenged theory is greater than 
that of competing approaches. 
Measured against this standard, the originalist approach fares 
quite well. The intent of the framers is no more difficult to ascertain 
than conventional morality,24 the requirement of representation-re-
inforcement analysis,2s or the decision that will best advance the 
cause of socialism.26 In a comparative perspective, the argument 
from the need for certainty is not fatal to originalist theory. 
More commonly, nonoriginalists argue that original ism specifi-
cally requires that clear, noncontroversial answers be derivable 
from a search for the intent of the framers.27 This contention, how-
ever, misapprehends the essential nature of originalism. Obviously 
certainty is a value which enhances the appeal of any legal theory. 
Originalist theory, however, is primarily concerned with addressing 
far more fundamental concerns. It is not the results generated by 
reference to the intent of the framers-clear or unclear, concrete or 
vague-which provide the core of originalism's appeal. Instead, the 
appeal derives from a particular conception of law, which in turn 
requires the use of a specific judicial reasoning process. The process 
22. See, e.g., Brest, supra note I, at 218-22; Tushnet, supra note 17, at 796-804. 
This argument should be distinguished carefully from that which holds that the intent of 
the framers can be determined definitively, and that the requisite intent was to create an 
"open-ended" constitutional order. See, e.g., 1. ELY, supra note I, at 11-41; Sedler, The 
Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication: An Assessment and a Different Perspective, 
44 OHIO ST. L.1. 93, 126-37 (1983). Cf Bryden, Politics. the Constitution, and the New For-
malism, 3 CONST. COMM. 415, 427 (1986). 
23. See Brest, supra note I, at 222 (by implication). 
24. E.g., Perry, Abortion. The Public Morals and the Police Power: The Ethical Func-
tion of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976); Wellington, Common Law 
Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.1. 221 
(1973). 
25. 1. ELY. :>upra notes I & 8 and accompanying text. 
26. Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 43 OHIO ST. L.1. 411 (1981). 
27. See Tushnet, supra note 17, at 793. 
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does not require judges to perform the impossible task of divorcing 
themselves from the political, historical, and cultural context in 
which they function; instead, all that is required is that judges apply 
the conventions inherent in originalist theory to make their best es-
timate of the "framers' intent." 
POLITICAL AND MORAL THEORY 
Of course, the concept of law embodied by originalism is itself 
a manifestation of a particular political or moral worldview. If one 
could prove that this worldview is totally indefensible, then the ar-
gument for originalism would also be refuted. 
The nonoriginalist argument based on political and moral the-
ory begins with the assumption that any defensible approach to con-
stitutional adjudication must be derivable from some coherent 
political or moral theory. Nonoriginalists argue that it is impossible 
to construct such a theory which supports a requirement that the 
courts be bound by the intent of the framers.2s In taking this posi-
tion, they focus primarily on the two arguments upon which 
originalists themselves rely most heavily: the appeal to democratic 
theory29 and the appeal to the concept of law itself.3o 
Although it is probably the most popular defense of original-
ism, the appeal to democratic theory is also the easiest to dismiss. 
The Constitution itself plainly establishes rights which are inconsis-
tent with the basic concept of majoritarian rule. The existence of 
these rights cannot be reconciled with "democracy" by pointing out 
that the Constitution itself was adopted through a democratic pro-
cess; clearly, the principle of majority rule must refer to contempo-
rary majorities, not those which existed in 1787.31 Thus, the appeal 
to democratic theory is best understood as "a conceptually muddled 
groping for judicial restraint."32 
Moreover, in some circumstances democratic theory would 
support nonoriginalist activism. For example, the framers plainly 
intended that the states retain a large measure of autonomy in de-
termining the structure of their respective governments. Accord-
ingly, from an originalist perspective the reapportionment cases 
probably were wrongly decided.33 But from the standpoint of dem-
28. E.g., Bennett, The Mission of Moral Reasoning in Constitutional Law, 58 S. CAL L. 
REV. 647 (1985); Simon, supra note 7. 
29. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note I, at 1·9; Bennett, supra note 28, at 648. 
30. See Dworkin, supra note 17, at 474-75; Simon, supra note 7. 
31. See Maltz, New Thoughts, supra note 4, at 821-22; Sager, Rights Skepticism and 
Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 417, 443-45 (1981). 
32. Bennett, supra note 28, at 648. 
33. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 69-98; Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as 
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ocratic theory "one person, one vote" is preferable to the framers' 
intentions. In this context, originalist theory thus leads to a (good 
or bad) antidemocratic result. 
The originalist position is not grounded on democracy. It is 
grounded on the concept of law. On this point Professor Ronald 
Dworkin aptly summarizes the essence of the nonoriginalist attack: 
"[n]one of the standing philosophical theories of law supplies the 
necessary arguments [to justify the adoption of originalism]."34 Ob-
viously, even if correct this statement alone does not discredit 
originalism; if originalism can be viewed as a product of some co-
herent theory of law, it matters little that the theory is different 
from that espoused by (for example) Bentham, Austin, Kelsen or 
Hart. Nonoriginalists, however, go further, arguing that it is im-
possible to construct the necessary philosophical theory.35 And so, 
they conclude, originalism must be abandoned. 
In order properly to evaluate this claim, one must first focus on 
the nature and limits of the concept of philosophical proof itself. 
Philosophers sometimes analogize their approach to the scientific 
method. But the two disciplines differ in at least one important re-
spect. The ultimate test of any scientific theory is the extent to 
which the model generated by the theory coincides with observable 
physical reality; if proven inconsistent with that reality, any the-
ory-no matter how elegant-must be abandoned or modified. 
Moral and political philosophers, by contrast, have no tangible 
baseline against which to measure their normative theories. The 
question of whether an approach is valid or not is determined solely 
by reference to a group of abstract rules which establish guidelines 
by which various attempts at "proof" are evaluated. Typically, 
legal philosophers adopt a set of principles which might be de-
scribed as "syllogistic" or "Aristotelian." These rules require that 
the philosopher first describe a set of basic axioms-premises-
which are to be taken as givens in his system of thought. From 
these established premises, the philosopher is to apply the rules of 
deductive logic to generate other guidelines-conclusions. The va-
lidity of a particular approach is determined by the extent to which 
the philosopher has followed the logical rules in generating his con-
clusions from his premises. 
Political Compromise-Section One in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 933,969-70 (1984). For contrary views, see J. ELY, supra note I, at 118-19; Van Alstyne, 
The Fourteenth Amendment. The "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 33. 
34. Dworkin, supra note 17, at 474. 
35. See. e.g., Richards, supra note 15, at 506 (defenses of original ism rest on "bad" 
philosophy); Simon, supra note 7. 
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One can of course reject entirely the theory that the rules of 
syllogistic philosophical argument should govern one's view of vari-
ous approaches to constitutional analysis. But even if one accepts 
the basic theory, its utility as an analytic tool is limited. For by its 
nature Aristotelian logic can only be applied to deductions from ba-
sic premises. If the premises themselves are based on assertions re-
garding the nature of observable phenomena, the assertions can be 
checked against the actual state of the real world. The axioms of 
originalism, however, are based instead on fundamental notions re-
garding the nature of justice. One can of course disagree with such 
premises; but one cannot use logic to prove them wrong. 
To illustrate this point in a limited context, assume that the 
members of two different religious groups are arguing over an issue 
of constitutional law. Members of each group believe as a matter of 
faith that a particular book contains the revealed word of God and 
that the contents of that book should guide judges in constitutional 
cases. They differ in the identity of the book which they consider 
authoritative. One group- the Traditional Men's Church 
(TMC)-believes in the Book of Falwell, which states clearly that 
women are to remain subordinate both in the home and in society 
generally. The other group-the Women's Progressive Temple 
(WPT)-adheres to the Book of Smeal, which insists on sexual 
equality. 
Obviously, on sex discrimination issues the TMC members 
would advocate a different judicial posture than would members of 
WPT. But neither group could be accused of taking illogical posi-
tions in the formal sense. Each would simply be following its re-
spective basic premises in an entirely consistent manner. 
Like the respective teachings of the Books of Falwell and 
Smeal, originalist theory defines its own internal logic. The theory 
establishes a hierarchy of premises which judges are expected to fol-
low in order to reach decisions in constitutional cases. Each of 
these premises (as well as their respective places in the hierarchy) 
reflects a value judgment rather than a deduction from other prem-
ises. It is this set of value judgments which forms the body of the 
originalist approach. One can disagree with the approach; but since 
its elements are not derived from other premises, originalism cannot 
effectively be refuted by a charge of logical inconsistency. 
If the premises of originalism were foreign to the fundamental 
political conceptions of American society one might well argue that 
originalist theory could be summarily dismissed. One can of course 
adopt whatever premises he chooses, but some are sufficiently far-
fetched that they can be safely ignored. Professor Mark Tushnet's 
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suggestion that courts decide cases in the fashion best calculated to 
advance socialism may well fit this description. The basic underpin-
nings of originalism, however, hardly fall into this category. 
Originalism embodies two basic, related ideas on the appropri-
ate structure of the governing process. First, the theory rests on the 
mundane observation that even in constitutional litigation the 
power of judges derives from the fact that they are sitting as judges 
in courts. Typically, this power is viewed as bounded by a variety 
of legal conventions, some of which (such as respect for precedent) 
are often articulated, but many of which are so basic that they gen-
erally remain unstated. Originalists claim quite simply that analo-
gous conventions should be applicable in the constitutional context. 
The second observation on which originalist theory rests is that 
in constitutional cases judges are relying on a written source of au-
thority-a constitution. For this reason, say the originalists, judges 
should adopt legal conventions analogous to those which govern the 
interpretation of other authoritative documents such as contracts 
and (especially) statutes. It is these conventions which are embod-
ied in the common use of the intent term. 
These basic concepts reflect values which are widely shared in 
American society. One can of course disagree with these values or 
argue that in some circumstances they should be subordinated to 
other concerns. But disagreement does not demonstrate that the 
originalist mode of analysis is untenable; only that-like every other 
constitutional theory-it is controversial and likely to remain so. 
A nonoriginalist might still claim to have proved his point by 
noting that while he is unable to totally discredit originalism, any 
defense of originalism is likely to be equally inconclusive. The no-
noriginalist would argue that in the absence of such a conclusive 
defense, a judge should not adopt a mode of analysis which prevents 
her from reaching results which she believes to be desirable. 
Here the issue turns on the burden of persuasion. The 
nonoriginalist would focus on the fact that restrictions placed on 
the judiciary by originalism force judges to eschew decisions they 
would otherwise desire. Surely, she would argue, such restrictions 
require cogent justification. By contrast, the originalist would note 
that he is simply asking that judges remain within their normal role. 
He would contend that the person asking judges to step outside that 
role-the nonoriginalist-should bear the burden of demonstrating 
the clear superiority of her argument. Neither contention is facially 
absurd; one's view of the proper resolution of the burden of proof 
dispute is likely to track closely his view of originalism generally. 
Thus, a nonoriginalist relying on this argument would demonstrate 
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only that a rejection of originalism is plausible. He would not have 
proven the claim that reliance on the intention of the framers is 
totally insupportable. 
Of course, the failure of the absolute arguments to conclusively 
discredit originalism does not prove that it is preferable to other 
modes of constitutional analysis. The failure does, however, have 
important implications for the terms of the debate. For if the dis-
cussion must be in comparative terms, then almost inevitably polit-
ical arguments will predominate-arguments which must consider 
not only specific results, but also the appropriate structure of gov-
ernment generally. And on the latter issue, originalists necessarily 
start with a built-in advantage. For the originalist position embod-
ies more widely-held views of the appropriate function of judges 
generally in a well-ordered society. 
